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Abstract 
This paper investigates the performance of socially responsible investment (SRI) 
funds in northern and continental Europe. The study compares SRI funds to non-
SRI funds in different market states by analyzing monthly returns of equally 
weighted fund portfolios using the Carhart four-factor model and the Fama French 
five factor model. The results show that SRI funds do not significantly differ in 
results from characteristics-matched conventional funds in non-crisis periods but 
appear to offer the investor some protection in crisis periods relative to conventional 
funds. We conclude that further research is needed and that these should investigate 
the effects of different screening criteria. 
 
Keywords: Socially responsible investments, fund performance, market states, 
bull,bear,return 
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1 Background 
 
 For the past two decades, there has been an exponential increase in the interest for socially 
responsible investments (SRI), also known as ethical investments or sustainable investments. 
These types of investments aspire to take a higher degree of responsibility concerning how their 
portfolio addresses the environmental, social and ethical issues that are connected to their 
respective line of business. SRI is a process that consists of either negative or positive 
screenings, or a combination of the two in order to ensure that the investor’s funds are invested 
in companies that fill these criteria. Negative screenings exclude certain businesses that are 
deemed to be unacceptable or otherwise controversial (e.g. tobacco, alcohol, gambling), whilst 
positive screenings aim to make sure to include businesses that are considered to be 
environmentally friendly, responsible or that adopt a best in class approach when selecting 
individual companies to include in a portfolio (USSIF, 2017). Presently, there is no clear 
definition of what constitutes as a SRI, but in general the previously stated methods are used in 
a combination with the ESG factors to identify companies that are considered superior (Eurosif, 
2016).  
 ESG is an umbrella term that includes three main factors: environmental, social and 
governance. Each factor further includes sub factors that are ever-shifting and constantly 
updated and renewed. Environmental, for instance, includes climate change, greenhouse 
emissions, resource depletion, waste and pollution, as well as deforestation. Social, 
encompasses factors, such as working conditions, health and safety, slavery, child labor and 
diversity. The final factor, governance, considers bribery, corruption, board diversification, tax 
strategies and other topics related to corporate governance. In combination the three factors 
measure the sustainability and ethical impact of a business or company’s investment decisions. 
  The concept of ethical investing in not a new phenomenon and historically the practice 
of investing ethically has been propagated by numerous religions, such as Judaism, Islam and 
Christianity. The theme in the early days being the condemnation of usury, putting restrictions 
on “sinful trade” (alcohol, gambling, weapons), as well as trade that exploits others. Looking 
back through history, ethical investing developed and oftentimes mimicked the political and 
social climate and has thus gone from being highly influenced by religion and the restriction on 
“sinful trade”, to women’s rights in the late 1920s. Later, the focus of these investments would 
shift towards the Vietnam War, apartheid in South Africa, Chernobyl and similar hot topics. It 
is therefore understandable that with the increased awareness of climate change and global 
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warming the focus today revolves around sustainability, renewable energy sources and human 
rights (Renneboog, L. Ter Horst, J. Zhang, C.  2008). 
 The rapid growth in SRIs that has been witnessed from the early 21st century and onwards 
can be contributed to the fact that investors demand investments that take the moral and 
environmental aspect of ownership into consideration. None of the previous studies have been 
able to present any aggregated data on assets under management (AUM) and/or number of SRI 
funds worldwide which makes it difficult to show the global development. The following two 
graphs give an indication of the development of SRI funds.  
 
The data is based on the signatories of the UN supported organization PRI and European SRI 
funds identified by the French organization Vigeo. Besides the apparent increase in total AUM 
in SRI, there has also been a dramatic growth in the number of funds classified as SRI.  
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 This trend has mainly been driven by large institutions, such as pension funds, and 
primarily those that have some element of government control guiding them in their decision 
making. This control can to some extent be observed through governmental regulation and 
legislation that has been put into place in order to direct and incentivize certain types of 
investments (Renneboog et al. 2008). 
The following table has been copied from Renneboog et al. (2008) and contains a brief summary 
of regulations related to SRI that has been introduced in various countries to promote ethical or 
green investments.  
 
Table 1 - SRI regulations 
        
Country SRI regulated regulations      
Australia In a 2001 bill it is stated that all investment firms´ product disclosure statements should include a 
description of “the extent to which labor standards or environmental, social or ethical considerations 
are taken into account”. Since 2001, all listed companies on the Australian Stock Exchange are 
required to make an annual social responsibility report. 
Belgium In 2001, Belgium passed the ‘Vandebroucke’ law, which requires pension funds to report the 
degree to which their investments take into account social, ethical and environmental aspects. 
France  In May 2001, the legislation “New Economic Regulations” came into force requiring listed 
companies to publish social and environmental information in their annual reports. 
Since February 2001 managers of the Employee Savings Plans are required to consider social, 
environmental or ethical considerations when buying and selling shares. 
Germany  Since 1991, the Renewable Energy Act gives a tax advantage to closed-end funds to invest in wind 
energy.  
Since January 2002, certified private pension schemes and occupational pension schemes ‘must 
inform the members in writing, whether and in what form ethical, social, or ecological aspects are 
taken into consideration when investing the pain-in contributions’. 
Italy Since September 2004 pension funds are required to disclose non-financial factors (including social, 
environmental and ethical factors) influencing their investments decision. 
Netherlands In 1995, the Dutch Tac Office introduced a ‘Green Savings and Investment Plan’, which applies a 
tax deduction for green investments, such as wind and solar energy, and organic farming. 
Sweden Since January 2002, Swedish national pension funds are obliged to incorporate environmental and 
ethical aspects in their investment policies. 
UK In July 2000, the Amendment to 1995 Pension Act came into force, requiring trustees of 
occupational pension funds in the UK to disclose in the statement of Investment Principles “the 
extent (if at all) to which social, environmental and ethical considerations are taken into account in 
the selection, retention and realization of investments” 
In 2002, The Cabinet Office in the UK published the Review of Charity Law in 2002, which 
proposed that all charities with an annual income of over £1 m should report on the extent to which 
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social, environmental and ethical issues are taken into account in their investment policy. The Home 
Office accepted theses recommendation in 2003. 
The Association of British Insurers (ABI) published a disclosure guideline in 2001, asking listed 
companies to report on material social, environmental and ethical risks relevant to their business 
activities.  
US Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which came into effect in July 2002, requires companies to 
disclose a written code of ethics adopted by their CEO, chief financial officer and chief accountant. 
This table summarizes the regulatory initiatives regarding SRI taken by national government in western countries. 
 
 There is plenty of research available that covers the performance of SRI funds. The 
general view of these studies is that the motives for investing ethically is either or a combination 
of three reasons. The first reason is that investors see a high level of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) as an indicator of high quality of management and therefore the firm is 
more likely to be superior to less responsible firms. The second view is similar to the first and 
says that responsible companies are exposed to less risk than companies that do not take as 
strong of a social responsibility. This is due to the lowered chance of litigation- and reputation 
costs in case of malpractice and accidents. The final reason is that investors have an altruistic 
motive, meaning that they take a moral approach when deciding where to invest. They receive 
utility from doing “good” by investing in companies that try to make society better (Cortez, M, 
C. Silva, F. Areal, N. 2009; Renneboog et al. 2008; Oikonomou, I. Brooks, C. Pavelin, S. 2012). 
 Two of the oldest and most developed SRI markets are the US and the UK markets. This 
has resulted in the fact that most of the research up to date has been performed in these markets 
exclusively, hence creating an information-gap compared to the rest of the other developed SRI 
market.    
 Edward Greene concludes in his study from 2007 that structural differences exist between 
US and European capital markets. These differences are not directed directly at mutual funds 
but involve regulatory issues such as accounting standards, auditing processes, non-financial 
disclosure, intermediaries and exchanges. He found that by harmonizing these differences the 
markets can reach a higher level of efficiency, as well as lower cost of capital and decreasing 
transaction costs. On basis of this argument it is fair to assume that there currently exist different 
obstacles between the two markets that potentially could explain the difference found by 
various studies. In their study on the development of CSR practice and theory Doh and Guay 
(2006) identifies several conceptual and practical differences in the field of CSR between the 
US and Europe. This could influence the way that investment decisions are made by fund 
managers and further explain the differences between studies on SRI performance. Finally, in 
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their study from 2008, Renneboog et al. show that in their sample the European based SRI funds 
(excluding the UK) are more likely to use positive screening compared to the US and the UK. 
In the US and the UK the use of negative screening is more common than in the rest of Europe. 
The study investigates SRI funds worldwide and is based on a sample including almost all SRI 
funds active at the time. This indicates that there might be differences in the selection process 
between the two areas, which provide further evidence for structural differences. Therefore, we 
want to expand the previous research made on the performance of SRI funds, which is mainly 
US and UK based, to see if the results hold under different capital market conditions and CSR 
frameworks.  
 
 
 
1.1 Research Question 
 The question that this paper will attempt to answer is: 
  
“How do European SRI funds perform compared to conventional funds and do they, 
as some research claims, offer investors downside protection?” 
  
 In doing so, we investigate whether investments in funds with ethical standards are 
inconsistent with the traditional wealth maximization paradigm of finance, and portfolio theory. 
Further, we will investigate if our findings deviate substantially from the results of Leite and 
Cortez (2015) who performed a similar study on explicitly French SRI funds.  
 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 The main purpose of this thesis is to expand on the existing research performed by 
Nofsinger and Varma (2014) and Cortez and Leite (2015) who analyzed the performance of 
SRI funds compared to conventional funds. By extending their research we hope to contribute 
to the general understanding of SRI funds and discover if Leite and Cortez’ findings hold true 
for the rest of the European SRI fund market. In doing so we aspire to bridge the existing 
information-gap that currently exists regarding the European fund market (excluding U.K), as 
well as investigating whether SRI can be said to offer any downside protection in times of 
economic distress, as CSR literature claims.  
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 In contrast to the massive growth this sector has experienced, research on the European 
SRI fund market is scarce. Subsequently making this type of study important for the 
institutional investors who are driving the growth, as well as for the individual whose funds 
they are managing.  
 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
 The timeframe of the data in this thesis spans from the beginning of 2005 to the end of 
2016. This restriction on time allows for testing before and after crisis periods, but removes the 
crisis of 2001-2003. The removal of the crisis in 2001-2003 was required in order to acquire a 
sufficiently big sample from the Bloomberg database. The reason for this is that funds tend to 
either merge with other funds over time or die. Subsequently, it would have reduced the pool 
of funds available for selection. Furthermore, the recent growth in both, AUM and number of 
funds, started somewhere around the beginning of the 21st century, thus the restriction in time 
allows us to gather a larger sample. 
  When constructing the two portfolios we put a geographical restriction on which funds to 
include. Funds that had their country of origin in Europe were viable as candidates, excluding 
the UK. More countries were intended to be represented in our final dataset but in the process 
of collecting data it turned out that only funds from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland could meet our selection criteria, therefore the 
European SRI portfolio is represented by funds from eight countries. A possible explanation 
for this might be that being able to invest capital ethically is a luxury good reserved for the 
wealthiest countries (Kurtz, L. 2005). We did find SRI funds from other countries in other 
databases, but as we did not have access to the return data from these we chose to use the data 
gathered from Bloomberg. 
  Consistent with similar studies, we have limited our universe of funds to mutual funds 
that invest in equity exclusively. This is primarily because we wish to investigate the 
performance of the underlying stock of the funds and not dilute the performance by including 
a significant amount of bonds or other fixed income assets. 
 Due to the limitation in time and resources, this study, unlike some of the larger 
contemporary studies only analyzes the performance of selected funds.  Thus, it does not offer 
insight on the effect of factors such as fund strategy, managerial ability, market timing 
strategies, investment styles or type of screening procedure.    
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 1 will introduce the reader to 
findings from previous studies and literature as well as the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
Section 2 explains the methodology, models and data used. Section 3 presents the empirical 
results and discusses our findings. Section 4 gives a summary and offers conclusions about the 
study as well as suggestions for future research 
 
2 Theoretical References and Findings  
 
 The paper is based on the theory formulated by Eugene Fama about “Efficient Market 
Hypothesis” (EMH). The hypothesis states that there is a perfect market where the price of a 
security reflects its true value. The assumptions of the hypothesis are that there are no 
transaction costs, information is without costs and investors have all available information. This 
leads to prices of securities to fully reflect the available information, and that investors have 
homogenous expectations. Meaning that the average expectation of the security by investors is 
the true value of the security, and that investors are rational. Providing that these assumptions 
hold true, investors make decisions on a rational basis in order to maximize utility.  
 In reality, this hypothesis and whether its assumptions hold is questioned. In this study 
we will specifically look whether we can find proof against it when looking at the returns of 
SRI funds. Some of the research done on the performance of SRI funds and stocks shows that 
they behave differently in bull and bear markets. The authors argued that this was based on 
discrepancies in information asymmetry, where normal stocks were found to have a higher 
volatility during bear periods. The explanation for this was that they were subject to a higher 
level of information asymmetry (Oikonomou et al. 2012; Nofsinger, J. Varma, A. 2014). 
  Additionally, we use the Portfolio Theory by Harry Markowitz from 1952. The theory 
states that investors are risk averse, meaning that when choosing between two portfolios with 
the same return the investor will always prefer the less risky portfolio, the portfolio with the 
lowest volatility. An investor will only take on more risk if the return is higher and will choose 
its risk level with regard to the personal risk aversion. In Markowitz’s theory investors gain by 
diversifying, the more stocks that is held by the investor the less firm specific risk the investor 
will be target of by each individual firm. If the investor is fully diversified the investor will only 
be subject to the market risk and the volatility will be minimized relatively to the return the 
investor receives. In order for a stock to contribute to a portfolio the stock cannot be perfectly 
correlated with any of the other stocks in the portfolio.  
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 However, Oikonomou et al. (2012) find evidence that the performance of firms with 
strong corporate social performance (CSP) is weakly negatively related to systemic risk 
compared to other firms. Further, they find that during times of high market volatility firms that 
are socially irresponsible experience higher levels of financial risk. This shows that even though 
SRI funds might incur a cost of lost diversification, SRI firms have a lower downside risk. This 
finding together with the Prospect Theory formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) might 
explain why investors are willing to accept lower return due to loss of diversification. The 
Prospect Theory states that investors value a loss higher than a gain of the same magnitude. 
Thus, investors trade the gains of diversification against downside protection and are equally 
or better off.  In this study, we will look at whether the screening process when investing might 
constrain SRI investors from gaining the benefits of full diversification as stated by the Portfolio 
Theory or if the downside protection offered by SRI counterweighs this cost. 
 
 
2.1 Empirical Evidence 
 Historically, most studies that have focused on measuring SRI performance have been 
performed mainly on the US and the UK fund market. This has left a gap regarding the 
European fund market. Recent studies have attempted to bridge some of this gap and investigate 
whether the different markets behave in a similar fashion. 
 The first study that focused on Europe and spanned over several countries was the one 
performed by Kreander, Gray, Power and Sinclair (2005), in which a comparative analysis of 
the weekly returns of 40 SRI funds and 40 non-SRI funds was made over the span of 1996-
1998. The performance was measured by comparing the average Jensen’s alpha where they 
found that the returns of the funds were very similar, but not significant. They also tested for 
market timing ability of the managers and found it to be negative, implying that managers tried 
to time the market, but did so at the wrong time.  
 In addition, Renneboog et al. (2008) analyzed 440 global funds to test their hypothesis 
that investors were willing to pay a price for ethics. Their results supported this theory as they 
found that many of the European and Asian SRI funds underperformed compared to their 
benchmark portfolios. On average, the SRI funds underperformed by 5% annually, implying 
that ethical investors are willing to forego returns in exchange for CSR behavior. Further, they 
found that a fund’s risk-adjusted returns and loadings on risk factors were significantly 
impacted by its screening activities. 
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 In the paper published by Cortez et al. (2009), the authors tested the performance of SRI 
funds from seven European countries during the period of 1996-2007 and compared them to a 
set of conventional and socially responsible benchmark portfolios. Using unconditional and 
conditional models they found that SRI funds on average perform on par with conventional 
funds and that adding a layer of social screening will not reduce the return of an investor’s 
portfolio that carries European funds. Meaning that investors are able to invest according to 
social values without having to compromise the financial performance of their portfolio. These 
findings are in contradiction with the Portfolio Theory that argues that any imposition on a 
portfolio's ability to diversify will result in a reduction in adjusted returns. 
 More recently Leite and Cortez (2015) undertook an extensive investigation of the French 
SRI market, which currently is the leading European market on SRI funds. In the study, they 
look closer at the performance, investment styles and managerial abilities of these funds. 
Inspired by Areal, Cortez and Silva (2013) and Nofsinger and Varma (2014) who analyzed the 
US market during crisis and non-crisis periods. Leite and Cortez theorized that if a company’s 
good reputation protects their stock price in economic downturns, a portfolio of ethical 
companies should in theory generate higher returns compared to non-ethical portfolios in times 
of crisis. What they found, however, showed that SRI funds match the performance of 
conventional funds in times of crisis, but significantly underperform conventional funds in non-
crisis periods. Leite and Cortez (2015) concluded that the underperformance in good times was 
primarily driven by the negative screening process, as the funds that use positive screening 
perform similarly with conventional funds independent of market state. Further, they found 
significant differences in investment styles during good times but very little difference in bad 
times. The same results were observed in managerial ability. 
 These results differ from the original American study by Nofsinger and Varma (2014) 
who found that SRI funds outperform conventional funds in the US market during crises, but 
underperformed in non-crisis periods. The higher return in economic downturns was primarily 
attributed to funds that used positive screening.  
  Summarizing previous research, there is an increasing amount of published material on 
the subject, but consensus regarding SRI performance is still lacking. Numerous studies from 
both, the US and Europe, have been made on the topic of performance of SRI funds compared 
to traditional funds but no general statement can be made. The results vary across different 
periods of time, long and short term, as well as when comparing portfolios of funds to the 
individual funds in financial results. Some suggest that SRI underperform during times of 
economic crisis while some suggest the opposite and some indicate that they outperform the 
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traditional funds in the long perspective. Which is one of the theories that proponents of ethical 
investments use to explain why it is advantageous with SRI in comparison with conventional 
investments. The general theme is that SRI funds perform on par or underperform slightly when 
comparing to conventional funds but they differ in regards to money-flows and in some studies, 
there was a lower volatility of returns in SRI funds compared to that of conventional funds 
(Bollen, N. 2007; Renneboog et al. 2008 & 2011). 
  Over time, the general approach of estimating performance in studies that investigates 
SRI funds has also developed. One of the earliest methods of measuring fund performance was 
a simplified version of the one used today. This approach was mainly comparing the Jensen’s 
alpha of SRI funds and conventional funds in order to find differences in returns between the 
two categories (Mill, G. 2006). Over the years, there has been a long and pertinent debate on 
the topic of appropriate benchmarks when measuring performance of mutual funds. Although, 
recent evidence indicates that a multi-factor model is more useful than a single-factor model 
when it comes to measuring portfolio returns (Cortez et al 2009). This evidence is consistent 
with the literature referred to in our thesis, where more and more studies are using a multi-factor 
model in which control variables and different variations of fund traits are considered. Some of 
the most commonly used models include the CAPM, the Fama French multifactor model and 
the Carhart four factor model. The two latter models are the ones applied to our study. 
 
3 Methodology 
 In order to investigate whether there is a difference in financial performance between SRI 
funds and conventional funds we use a time series analysis where we compare the monthly 
returns of SRI funds and conventional funds to each other and over time. Furthermore, we 
compare the returns in times of economic crisis and in the “normal” state of the economy, we 
consider these mutually exclusive. We look at monthly returns during the period of January 1, 
2005 until December 31, 2016. This gives data before, during and after the identified crisis 
periods. By using data from this period, we are able to distinguish any potential differences 
related to the returns of the two types of funds and any potential differences during crisis periods 
and non-crisis periods. This approach is similar to the one used by Leite and Cortez (2015) who 
studied French SRI funds and Nofsinger and Varma (2014) who studied US SRI funds, the 
latter we follow more closely during our study.  
 When collecting data for our sample we had difficulties matching conventional funds to 
SRI funds which no longer were active due to being liquidated or merged. This resulted in a 
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restriction of our sample on funds that are currently active, and therefore our sample is subject 
to survivorship bias. However, in our sample the bias is present in both the SRI funds and the 
conventional funds. We make the assumption that the bias does not differ between the two types 
of funds. There is to our knowledge no study showing that the survivorship bias is different 
between SRI funds and conventional funds, thus making this a fair assumption.  
 
 
3.1 Data 
 The data used was collected from Bloomberg. In a few funds, some of the data was 
missing and in these cases, we complemented by using data from Morningstar. In order to find 
an appropriate sample, we started limiting our search. As the study is concentrated to funds 
with their domicile in Europe, excluding the UK, we began by excluding funds which do not 
have their domicile in these countries. We then screened on funds with the classification ESG 
within Bloomberg. This is a very wide definition, as discussed in the introduction, which 
captures either positive and negative screening or a combination of the two. Furthermore, we 
restricted our search to funds with an inception date of the latest January 1, 2005 and that the 
funds were still active as of December 31, 2016. We also limited our search to mutual funds 
investing in mainly equity. This gave a sample of 102 funds. 25 funds were excluded, since 
these funds were suspiciously similar to other funds in the sample. These excluded funds were 
usually funds of the same fund family, investing in the same geographical area with marginal 
differences to each other in regards of their holdings. After the screening process, we reached 
our final sample that consisted of 77 funds in total, which differed in level of risk, geographical 
focus and investment focus.     
 With a complete sample of SRI funds, we started by constructing our sample for the 
comparison group, the conventional funds. The process was similar to the collection process of 
the SRI funds but instead we looked at funds that were not classified as ESG. We ensured to 
include funds with their domicile in countries that matched our sample of SRI funds. The 
selected funds had their origin in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland. We used the same restriction in time, an inception date of the latest 
January 1, 2005 and that the funds were still active as of December 31, 2016. The comparison 
group was also limited to funds mainly investing in equity. These restrictions rendered a sample 
of 3408 funds. From these funds, we matched two funds to every SRI fund. The pairing of funds 
depended on whether the funds matched each other in terms of size and characteristics. These 
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steps were taken for each SRI fund. The first restriction in the matching process was that the 
two matched conventional funds had to have the same domicile as the SRI fund to which they 
are matched. As a next step, we matched based on geographical focus, this means that the two 
conventional funds had to have the same restriction on where they invest. The geographical 
focus could for example be funds only investing in Europe, Asia, North America, OECD 
countries or Global funds with no restrictions. The next criteria for matching was investment 
focus, the conventional funds had to have the same type of investments. This was in almost all 
cases a “broad market” focus, which means that the fund could invest in any stock from the 
geographical area they were active in. There were 7 funds deviating from the “broad market” 
investment focus. These were funds with focus on small capitalized stocks, mid capitalized 
stocks, emerging markets or developed markets. The last criteria used for matching was the risk 
level of the SRI fund. This was proxied by a combination of median market capitalization of 
holdings and average price per earnings for each fund. By going through these steps for each 
of our SRI funds we reached the final sample which therefore contained 231 funds, of which 
77 were SRI funds and 154 were conventional funds. We continued by collecting the monthly 
returns including reinvested dividends and management fees from Bloomberg. The following 
table gives a summary of the funds in the sample. 
Table 2 - Summary of funds   
Domicile SRI Conventional Total 
Austria 2 4 6 
Belgium 5 10 15 
France 26 52 78 
Germany 3 6 9 
Luxembourg 8 16 24 
Norway 14 28 42 
Sweden 17 34 51 
Switzerland 2 4 6 
Total 77 154 231 
This table summarizes the funds in the sample  
 
 Although the starting point of the financial crisis is quite commonly thought of as the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers there is still deviations in opinions of when it ended. This, 
together with various definitions of the starting and end point of the Euro crisis, actualized that 
we needed to define these periods. In order to define the starting and end dates for the Financial 
crisis and the Euro crisis we used existing data on crisis periods derived by the algorithm created 
by Pagan and Sossounov (2003).     
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 This approach was used by Leite and Cortez (2015), which we replicated when defining 
our crisis periods. The algorithm identifies bull and bear markets by looking at a window length 
of plus, minus eight months and locating peaks and troughs. Bull and bear markets are then 
identified as increases or decreases in the stock market index by at least 20% measured from 
given peak to trough, or vice versa. A peak is for example identified by equation (1) and a 
trough equation (2).  
 
𝑷𝒆𝒂𝒌 = [𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕−𝟖, … , 𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕−𝟏 < 𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕 > 𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕+𝟏, … , 𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕+𝟖]  (1) 
 
𝑻𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 = [𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕−𝟖, … , 𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕−𝟏 > 𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕 < 𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕+𝟏, … , 𝐥𝐧𝑷𝒕+𝟖]  (2) 
 
 In order to use the algorithm, we needed to choose a stock index to measure peaks and 
troughs, the index chosen was MSCI EMU. The two rationales behind this index were firstly, 
that half of our funds are investing only in European and Eurozone equities. The second 
rationale was that it is the most appropriate index to capture the effect of the Eurozone debt 
crisis. 
 
Table 3 - Identification of crisis periods 
  
 Start date End date Change in market index Length of periods (months) 
Financial Crisis 2007/06 2009/03 -57,57% 21  
Euro Crisis 2011/05 2012/05 -24,23% 13 
 2015/03* 2015/09 -19,7% 7 
 2015/12 2016/10 -22,2% 11 
Identified bear markets according to the methodology used by Pagan and Sossounov (2003). Market index used is  
MSCI EMU. 
*Not a crisis, as it does not meet the criteria of -20%. 
 
 By using this method, we were able to identify three bear markets. The first one is the 
“Financial Crisis” that occurred in June 2007 and lasted for 21 months. The second one was the 
“Euro Crisis” that began in May 2011 and ended 13 months later. A third bear period was, 
unexpectedly, identified in December 2015 and lasted for 11 months. This last bear period was 
not robust when using other indices and was excluded when controlling the robustness of our 
findings. The Financial crisis and Euro crisis were robust when using other indices. There are 
some slight differences in dates but these differences did not affect our final result. Another 
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potential crisis period was pinpointed for the period of 2013-2014 but was not included in the 
data due to it falling short of the 20% decrease in the stock market index that defines a bear 
market. The period measured a 19,7% decrease and was thus removed but was used in the 
robustness check of our results.     
 When measuring our excess return, our benchmark market index was the MSCI World 
Total Net Return. Even though half of the funds in the SRI and Conventional portfolio have a 
regional focus in Europe, about 40% of them invest globally. Further, investors are not bound 
by borders and thus returns should be compared to the return an investor could gain by investing 
in a well-diversified portfolio. We used a total return index because it treats dividends the same 
way as our funds do, they are continuously reinvested and not compounded. Later on, we also 
changed this index in order to control the robustness of the results. 
 
3.2 Model 
 Similar to Renneboog et al. (2008), Nofsinger and Varma (2014) and Leite and Cortez 
(2015), we used a multifactor model to analyze the collected data. This is considered to be the 
most accurate method of measuring performance of portfolios (Mill, G. 2006). The multifactor 
models were based on the findings from Fama and French (1993) where they found that 
including additional risk factors to the traditional CAPM model is a more successful way to 
measure portfolio performance. The strength of a multifactor model is that it deals with 
problems arising from endogeneity to a larger extent than the CAPM model does, since it 
explains more of the variation found in the returns of stocks. When the effect of the risk factors 
is taken into account the remaining, unexplained (also called the alpha), effect will show. We 
compared this effect between the SRI funds and the conventional funds to see if we could find 
any significant differences, which can be derived to our classification of SRI.  
 Nofsinger and Varma (2014) and Leite and Cortez (2015), are both using Carhart’s Four 
Factor Model to measure risk-adjusted abnormal return, where Leite and Cortez have included 
a fifth local factor in order to capture the regional effect of exclusively measuring French SRI 
funds (Carhart, M. 1997). As our area of interest is funds with domicile in the whole of Europe, 
excluding the U.K, we did not include a regional factor, since having European local factor 
would not likely explain the bias. The bias originated in the fact that investments tend to be 
made in firms in which the investor, in this case the fund manager, is more familiar with. 
Therefore, the bias is more likely to be country based or even regional within the country and 
not European (Merton, R. 1987). Including a local factor dependent on the domicile of the fund 
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we neither found appropriate as some of the funds have geographical restrictions which does 
not include its own domicile.    
 Further, Nofsinger and Varma measured the risk-adjusted abnormal return with three 
different models. These models are CAPM, Fama and French three-factor and Carhart four-
factor where they also included a dummy variable for crisis periods for all models. We chose 
to exclude the CAPM, as this model has shown weaknesses when explaining average return of 
an asset. This is due to the exclusion of other risk factors, which has been shown relevant for 
asset pricing. (Fama, E. French, K. 1993) As for the three-factor model we used the extended 
version derived by Fama and French in their paper from 2015. This model is shown to better 
explain the returns of portfolios with large and mid-capitalized stocks than their original three-
factor model and is therefore a more appropriate model (Fama, E. French, K. 2015). We used 
the two models to calculate the risk-adjusted abnormal return of the SRI portfolio and the 
portfolio consisting of conventional funds. Then we analyzed the differences between these 
returns.       
 The first model used is Carhart’s extended version of the Fama and French three-factor 
model, more commonly known as the Carhart four-factor model: 
 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 −  𝑹𝑭,𝒕 =  𝜶𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑹𝑴,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑭,𝒕) + 𝜷𝟐𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑴𝑶𝑴𝒊,𝒕 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑅𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝛼𝑖 = Four-factor alpha – the risk-adjusted return for portfolio i 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = The monthly premium of the book-to-market factor at time t 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
 
The model contains four factors in order to adjust the returns of the assets with regards to the 
level of risk associated with the asset. These factors are: the monthly market excess return 
(EXMKT), monthly premium of a portfolio of value stocks (HML), monthly premium of a 
portfolio of small capitalization stocks (SMB) and the monthly momentum factor (MOM), 
which is the premium of a portfolio of past winners.   
 The data for the factors were gathered from Kenneth French’s webpage, Mr. French 
publishes data of the factors monthly for different regions, these are based on all available 
equity data from each region. We used the global factors he provides which are calculated in 
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the same way as in the papers published 2012 and 2015, with one exception, being the market 
excess return which we constructed ourselves. The market excess return factor was calculated 
by using the monthly return of the index MSCI World Total Net Return minus the Euribor 1-
month rate. The Euribor 1-month rate was recalculated to a monthly basis from an annual basis. 
This was motivated, as the Euribor 1-month rate is a more appropriate measure of the risk-free 
rate than the T-bill since all the funds has their domicile in Europe. The HML factor is 
calculated by taking the average return of all value firms and subtracting the average return of 
all growth firms. The definition of value and growth is based upon the book-to-market of each 
firm. The SMB factor is calculated by taking the average return of all small firms and 
subtracting the average return of all big firms. A small firm is defined by being among the 10% 
lowest capitalized firms. The MOM factor is calculated by creating a portfolio of the firms with 
the best cumulative performance over the past 12 months and subtracting the same of a portfolio 
of the worst performing firms over the same time horizon. Performance is defined as return. 
Finally, a dummy variable was defined. The variable takes the value 1 during crisis periods and 
0 otherwise. This enabled us to measure the effect the crisis had on the portfolios and to 
investigate whether there is a difference between the SRI funds and conventional funds. Using 
the data from these factors including the dummy variable for crisis periods we arrived at the 
following model: 
 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 −  𝑹𝑭,𝒕 =  𝜶𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑹𝑴,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑭,𝒕) + 𝜷𝟐𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑴𝑶𝑴𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓 𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕 
 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 1 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 
 
 The second model is the Fama French five-factor model, which is an extension of the 
original Fama French Three Factor Model. This model shows weakness when explaining the 
returns of portfolios with small stocks, therefore we used the four-factor as our main model and 
the five-factor model as a complementary robustness check. This was justified as there were a 
few funds, which invested in small stocks exclusively, along with most of our funds being broad 
market funds. This might mean the five-factor model was not appropriate for measuring our 
portfolios. Further, our results from the four-factor model showed that both the SRI funds and 
the conventional funds had a positive and significant loading on the SMB factor. A positive 
loading on SMB means that the portfolio is more exposed to smaller stocks and this provided 
further evidence that the five-factor model might be less accurate than the four-factor 
model (Fama, E. French, K. 2015). 
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𝑹𝒊,𝒕 −  𝑹𝑭,𝒕 =  𝜶𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑹𝑴,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑭 𝒊,𝒕) + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑴𝑾𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑴𝑨𝒊,𝒕 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 
𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 
 
 The model still includes the factors market excess return, HML and SMB, but the MOM 
factor is not included. The two new factors are robust minus weak and conservative minus 
aggressive. Robust minus weak (RMW) is the monthly premium of a portfolio with robust 
operating profits. Conservative minus aggressive (CMA) is the monthly premium of a portfolio 
with a conservative investment style. The market excess return was calculated the same way as 
for the 4-factor model and the other factors is gathered from Mr. French’s webpage. The RMW 
factor is calculated by taking the average return of a portfolio with firms that have robust 
operating profit and subtracting the average return of a portfolio with firms that have weak 
operating profit. The CMA factor is calculated by taking the average return of a portfolio with 
conservative investments and subtracting the average return of a portfolio with firms that have 
aggressive investments. Conservative and aggressive investments are defined by the change of 
total assets from accounting data between two fiscal years, where conservative is a small change 
and aggressive a big change in total assets. We included a dummy variable for crisis periods in 
this model as well, with the variable taking the value 1 during the crisis periods and 0 otherwise. 
This resulted in the following model: 
 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑭,𝒕 =  𝜶𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑹𝑴,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑭,𝒕) + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑴𝑾𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑴𝑨𝒊,𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟔 𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕 
 
 Often time series data suffer from autocorrelation, the error terms are correlated over time. 
In order to account for any such effect, Newey-West estimators were used on both models when 
running regressions (Newey, W. West, K. 1987). 
 
4 Results and Analysis 
The following table presents descriptive statistics for the monthly returns over the sample 
period. 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics of monthly returns 
  
Mean 
Return 
Volatility Median Min. Value Max. Value 
Conventional 0,600 4,597 1,045 -30,75 31,69 
SRI 0,609 4,619 1,080 -32,83 27,50 
This table shows descriptive statistics of monthly returns   
       
 Table 5 present the alpha estimates and the factor loadings of the equally weighted 
portfolios for the entire sample period. The estimates for the alpha and the crisis periods were 
annualized. Thus, these coefficients show the annual under-/over performance and the annual 
effect of a crisis.      
 The coefficients for the differences were included to enhance the comparability between 
the two portfolios and is found by subtracting the returns of the conventional fund portfolio 
from the SRI fund portfolio, the other factors remained the same. 
Table 5 – Performance and risk estimates 
 
Carhart´s Four Factor                                   
 
 ⍺ 𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3 𝛽4 𝛽5 𝛽6  𝛽7 𝑅2 adj. Observations 
 Alpha MKT HML SMB RMW CMA MOM Crisis    
 
SRI  1,79 0,97*** -0,02  0,22**   -0,09** -7,23** 0,87 144 
Conventional  2,27 0,94*** -0,08  0,28**   -0,07* -8,46*** 0,86 144 
Difference -0,48 0,03***  0,07*** -0,06***   -0,02***  1,23* 0,37 144 
 
 
Fama French Five Factor                                   
 
 ⍺ 𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3 𝛽4 𝛽5 𝛽6  𝛽7 𝑅2 adj. Observations 
 Alpha MKT HML SMB RMW CMA MOM Crisis    
 
SRI  2,41 0,90*** 0,20**  0,11 -0,16 -0,50***  -5,50** 0,88 144 
Conventional  2,94 0,87*** 0,13  0,17* -0,13 -0,49***  -6,92*** 0,87 144 
Difference -0,52 0,03*** 0,07*** -0,06*** -0,04  0,00   1,43** 0,35 144 
 
This table presents the estimates of performance and risk factors for the two equally weighted portfolios of SRI funds and 
conventional funds for the entire sample period (January 2005 – December 2016). The alpha and crisis coefficients are presented 
as annualized percentage, whilst the risk factors are presented on a monthly basis. The coefficients 1-7 represent the factor 
loadings on the market excess return(MKT), the book-to-market factor(HML), the size factor (SMB), the factor of robust 
operating profits, the investment strategy factor(CMA), the momentum factor(MOM) and the crisis dummy(Crisis). The asterisks 
represent the level of statistical significance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and the 10%(*) 
 
 We found that the alphas for both models and fund types were positive, indicating that 
during this period they outperform the market. But as the alphas are insignificant we cannot 
conclude that they perform different than the market. When comparing alphas between SRI 
funds and conventional funds, our results show that conventional funds outperform SRI funds 
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by approximately 0.5% of annualized return for the non-crisis periods, independent of model. 
The lack of significant alphas makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about the overall 
performance of the portfolios, and when comparing the portfolios to each other.  
 These findings are in line with the findings of Nofsinger and Varma (2014) who neither 
found significant alphas for the performance or the difference between the portfolios. The 
results were also similar to Cortez et al. (2009) and Renneboog et al. (2008), which neither 
found any significant difference in the returns of SRI funds and conventional funds. 
 Looking more closely at the crisis periods, we observed that the effect of the crisis was 
strongly negative for both portfolios, although marginally higher in the five-factor model.  In 
the four-factor model, the crisis had an annualized average negative effect of -7.23% for SRI 
funds and -8.46% for conventional funds. For the five-factor model the results are -5.5% for 
SRI funds and -6,92% for conventional funds. This effect was significant at the 5% level for 
the SRI funds and at the 1% level for the conventional funds. The level of significance remained 
the same for both models and showed that SRI funds perform about 1,35% better returns in bear 
markets, at the 10% level for the four-factor model and 5% level for the five-factor model. This 
was in line with the findings of Oikonomou et al. (2012), who found that firms with a high level 
of CSP perform better during times of higher market volatility, but we observed the pattern at 
an aggregate fund level instead of the aggregate firm level. Additionally, Nofsinger and Varma 
(2014) also found that SRI funds perform significantly better than conventional funds during 
crisis periods.      
 In contrast, Leite and Cortez (2015) were unable to find any evidence supporting this 
claim in economic downturns. However, they did find that SRI funds significantly 
underperform conventional funds in non-crisis periods, whilst matching the performance in 
crisis periods. This means, that relatively, SRI funds perform better during crisis periods than 
non-crisis periods, which is in line with Oikonomou et al. (2012).  
 Subsequently, we could not conclude that SRI funds perform significantly different than 
conventional funds in non-crisis periods but it appears that they do offer investors some 
protection in economic downturns. As our results did not find a difference between the 
performances of SRI funds and conventional funds it was unclear whether an investor who 
invests long term has to sacrifice any upside in good times in order to get the downside 
protection that SRI funds offers in bad times.    
 Even though the focus of this study has been on the risk-adjusted returns of the portfolios, 
it may be of interest to note that the four-factor model produces significant differences in factor 
loadings for all four factors, with all factors significant but HML. This suggests that SRI funds 
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and conventional funds differ in their investment style and investigating the impact of this 
difference could shed more light upon the differences found in returns, or the absence of 
differences.      
 For both models, we found that SRI funds are more exposed to bigger firms than their 
conventional peers. Although, both of the fund types have a larger focus on small capitalized 
stocks. SRI funds also follow the benchmark market return more closely for both models. This 
shows that they follow the benchmark index more closely. Since our benchmark index, MSCI 
World, contains large and mid-capitalized stocks this makes sense. In addition, we found that 
for both models SRI funds tends to invest in growth stocks to a higher degree than conventional 
funds. For the individual portfolios, this coefficient is insignificant and therefore follows the 
market closely in the growth/value tradeoff. Finally, we found that both portfolios had a 
negative momentum effect showing that they were not exposed to past winners whereas SRI 
funds were marginally less exposed. 
 
4.1 Robustness 
 In order to control the validity of our results and for potential model misspecification we 
performed robustness controls. These included the exclusion of the third bear period, using the 
second model, the Fama and French 5-factor model, and controlling the results when using a 
different benchmark index and risk factors. We found that our results are robust to changes 
made in the model and the variables that were used.    
 When excluding the third crisis period the impact from the crisis variable was reduced, 
but was still negatively significant. The alpha was then negative, indicating that the portfolios 
underperformed the market but the effect was insignificant. The SRI funds still underperformed 
the conventional funds but the difference was still insignificant. The loadings of the factors 
were unchanged for both models with only slight differences.   
 The additional index used was MSCI Europe, including reinvested dividends. We found 
that the change of benchmark index did not change the results. Both models and both fund types 
had a slightly higher and significant coefficient on the excess market return factor, this was an 
expected result as half of our funds had their focus on European equities only and should 
therefore follow a European index more closely. Furthermore, we found that the European 
index lowers the impact of the crisis variable but the variable was still significant. This most 
likely originated from the fact that the Euro sovereign debt crisis has a stronger effect in the 
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European index than the world index and therefore some of the variation from this crisis was 
captured by the market factor. As for the alpha, it changed only slightly and remained 
insignificant. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 Even though the European fund market has experienced a surge during the past two 
decades, when it comes to both, the total number of SRI funds as well as the assets they manage, 
the topic remains largely unexplored outside of the US and the UK. This study expands the 
European research performed by Leite and Cortez (2015) further by including additional 
European countries which were excluded in their paper. This study investigates how SRI funds 
in northern and continental Europe perform compared to conventional funds in the period of 
2005-2016. Nofsinger and Varma (2014) and Oikonomou et al. (2012) argue that SRI practices 
may decrease downside risk and thus hold up better in crisis periods, therefore a timeframe was 
chosen as to include both, bull and bear markets.    
 With data obtained from Bloomberg we were able to construct two equally weighted 
portfolios where the funds matched certain characteristics that were selected in the screening 
process. One portfolio consisted of 77 SRI funds and the other of 154 conventional funds. We 
found that SRI funds significantly outperform conventional funds during crisis periods and 
slightly, but insignificantly underperform conventional funds during non-crisis periods. This 
further strengthens the findings of Nofsinger and Varma (2014) on the US market but was not 
completely in line with Leite and Cortez (2015) who found that SRI funds perform on par during 
crisis periods and underperform during non-crisis periods. Our study follows the methodology 
of Nofsinger and Varma (2014) more closely than Leite and Cortez (2015) who computed their 
own risk factors and added a local factor. This could potentially explain some of the difference 
in results.       
 Nofsinger and Varma (2014) argue that the reason for SRI funds outperforming 
conventional funds in the US during economic downturns were primarily driven by positive 
screening strategies. We believe that this could be a potential explanation in our study as 
European SRI funds use positive screening strategies to a larger extent (Renneboog et al. 2008 
& 2011).  
 Revisiting our research question, this study offers some support to the proponents of SRI. 
The results show that SRI funds do not differ significantly in performance in non-crisis periods 
while they do offer downside protection in crisis periods. This finding does not support the 
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Prospect Theory, as an investor does not have to sacrifice returns for downside protection. 
 Some final comments regarding the potential shortcomings of this study. We are aware 
of the fact that our sample is exposed to survivorship bias, which might cause a bias in our 
results. We made the assumption that the bias behaves the same between SRI funds and 
conventional funds. Since we have a sample of 144 observations per each of our 231 funds, it 
is reasonable to assume that on average, the effect of the bias should cancel out. If the 
assumption holds, the bias should not affect our estimates of the difference between SRI 
performance and conventional performance.    
 We further acknowledge that the study in its final form only includes funds from eight 
European countries. As a consequence, our results may not fully represent the remaining 
European SRI market, as originally intended and our conclusions might not hold for the 
remaining European SRI markets.    
 A last reflection regards the selection criteria ESG, that was used for the study. Being an 
umbrella term, it is inherently wide and makes it difficult to pinpoint what the exact cause to 
any variation in performance between SRI funds and conventional funds might be. Thus, this 
study still leaves some questions unexplored for further studies regarding the performance of 
SRI funds in the European market. Primarily, what effect screening procedures has on SRI 
performance. The only contemporary European study investigating this is the one by Leite and 
Cortez (2015) who found that in the French SRI market this had a significant effect when 
explaining the differences within the SRI segment. Further, we recommend that future research 
should focus on managerial abilities and how they may differ between SRI and non-SRI funds. 
This as the difference in risk factors from our study was highly significant, suggesting that some 
of the variation could be explained by investment styles.  
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EXR Monthly Return of Portfolio Minus the 1-month Euribor rate 
HML High Minus Low 
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RMW  Robust Minus Weak 
SMB Small Minus Big 
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Appendix 
This appendix describes our sample of SRI funds 
 
 Fund name                       Fund ticker                    Fund name                        Fund ticker           
 
ALLIANZ EURO EQTY CL TRANS-R ACTFRAN FP Equity GENERALI INV-SRI EUR EQTY-AX GENEDAX LX Equity 
DNB NORDEN III AFINDUS NO Equity TERRASSISI AKTIEN I AMI GERLG21 GR Equity 
ALLIANZ ACTIONS AEQUITAS AGFFIDA FP Equity DNB NAVIGATOR II GFNAVIG NO Equity 
ALLIANZ VALEURS DURABLES-R AGFOPID FP Equity ALM ACTIONS EUROPE ISR-IC ISCERAC FP Equity 
ATOUT FRANCE-C ATTFUTC FP Equity KBC INSTIT FD-SRI EURO EQ KBC6733 BB Equity 
CAN SUSTAINABLE WORLD-C BAC2700 BB Equity KBC ECO FUND-SUSTAIN EURLD-C KBEEEUC BB Equity 
SWEDBANK HUMANFOND BANHUMA SS Equity KCD-UNION-AKTIEN NACH-DJSG KCDAKTI GR Equity 
BNP PARIBAS ACTIONS EUR RE-D BNPETHE FP Equity KLP AKSJEGLOBAL INDEKS I KLPAKII NO Equity 
BNP PARIBAS RETRA RE HO-P100 BNPRFIX FP Equity KLP AKSJEUSA INDEKS USD KLPAUSA NO Equity 
AMUNDI ACTIONS EUROPE ISR-P CACDURA FP Equity LAZARD EQUITY SRI-C LOBETHQ FP Equity 
OHMAN SMABOLAGSFOND CARSMAB SS Equity ABN AMRO EURO SUSTAI EQUI-NC MAIT100 FP Equity 
DNB SVERIGE KONCIS CARSVKO SS Equity MEAG NACHHALTIGKEIT-A MEAGNAE GR Equity 
OHMAN UTLANDSFOND CARUTLN SS Equity NORDEA-INSTIT AKTIEFOND GLOB NORIAKG SS Equity 
AMUNDI VALEURS DURABLES CATOUDU FP Equity ALM ACTIONS ZONE EURO ISR-IC NSMCRET FP Equity 
LCL ACTIONS ETATS-UNIS ISR CLINGAM FP Equity ODDO GENERATION-CR-EUR ODDGENC FP Equity 
CANDR EQUITIES L-EMERG MKT-D CMU3470 LX Equity OHMAN ETISK INDEX EUROPA OETIEUR SS Equity 
CM-CIC OBJECTIF ENVIRONN-C CMVALTH FP Equity OHMAN ETISK INDEX JAPAN OETIJPN SS Equity 
EPARGNE ETHIQUE ACTIONS-C COCEPET FP Equity OHMAN ETISK INDEX PACIFIC OETIPAC SS Equity 
DANSKE INVEST HORISONT AKSJE DCFOKOP NO Equity OHMAN ETISK INDEX USA OETIUSA SS Equity 
CANDR EQUITIES L-SUST WRLD-C DEXLWWC LX Equity OFI RS EUR GROWTH CLI CHAN-I OFIMLEA FP Equity 
DELPHI EUROPE DFEUROP NO Equity OFI INVEST-RS ETH EUREQ-IEUR OMSSRIE LX Equity 
DNB GLOBAL ETISK V DIGLET4 NO Equity DPAM INV B FUND-EUR SUSTAI-B PAMEETH BB Equity 
DNB MILJOINVEST DIMILJO NO Equity PICTET-ETHOS CH SW SUST-PDY PICSEQS SW Equity 
DNB SMB DISMB NO Equity RAIFFEISEN-NCHHLT-AKTIEN-A RAIETAA AV Equity 
DNB USA DIUSAFD NO Equity BNP PARIBAS RETRAI RES 75-PD RETRIAT FP Equity 
DNB EUROPA DKEUROP NO Equity UBS L E-GLB SUSTAIN USD-PA SBCWEQI LX Equity 
DNB GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS DKGLEM NO Equity SEB HALLBARHETSFOND GLOBAL SEBETGL SS Equity 
ALLIANZ GLB SUSTAINBLTY-AE DREGLSU LX Equity SEB OSTERSJOFOND/WWF SEBOWWF SS Equity 
DANSKE INV SRI GLOBAL DSRIGBL SS Equity SEB UTLAND STIFTELSEFOND SEBUTST SS Equity 
LCL ACT DEVELOP DURABLE-C DYNDEVD FP Equity AMUNDI ACTIONS EURO ISR-P SICEURS FP Equity 
ECUREUIL BENEFICES RESPONS-D ECURLLE FP Equity STOREBRAND GLOBAL VERDI SPGLOBA NO Equity 
ETOILE DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE TENVIR FP Equity SPP AKTIEFOND GLOBAL SPPAKGS SS Equity 
S ETHIKAKTIEN-A ETHIKAT AV Equity STOREBRAND VEKST SPSMBFD NO Equity 
CB EUROPEAN QUALITY FUND-A EUREUEA LX Equity SWISSCANTO CH EF GREEN INV A SWCGREE SW Equity 
FEDERAL ACTIONS ETHIQUES FEDETHI FP Equity SWEDBANK ROBUR ETHICA GLOBAL SWESVGB SS Equity 
FEDERAL CONVICT ISR EURO-P FEDFREU FP Equity SWEDBANK ROB TALENT AKT MEGA SWTAKMG SS Equity 
BNP PARIBAS EUR VAL DUR-CL C FIMEUOP FP Equity NORDEA SWEDISH STARS TRETIII SS Equity 
JPMORGAN F-GLB SOCIAL RSP-A FLEMGSC LX Equity ATOUT EUROLAND-D UNIFRAN FP Equity 
DPAM INV B FUND-EQY WRL SU-A FNI4520 BB Equity   
 
